I Introduction
Despite co-discovering, with Keynes, the theoretical framework for the principle of effective demand, Kalecki was dubious about the ability of governments in capitalist economies to use macroeconomic policy to create full employment in the longer term. This is not due to any economic limitations on the efficacy o f these policies, but rather to more fundamental political ones which ensure that, unless the underlying institutions of capitalism are changed, full employment can not be maintained. The next section of this paper shows that Kalecki drew an important distinction between achieving full employment, which was possible with the aid of government fiscal policy increasing effective demand, and the maintenance of that employment.
According to Kalecki, political pressure ensured that full employment was incompatible with capitalist economies, unless there were fundamental changes. Section three of this paper argues that, without such changes, full employment can only ever be a temporary achievement.
Recently, some non-orthodox economists have proposed a solution to the problem of unemployment in capitalist economies referred to as either the buffer stock employment, or as the employer of the last resort. In essence the models treat employment like the stock of goods, with build up of inventories associated with economic downturns becoming the equivalent of unemployment,. The underlying idea is that the government should "buy" up this excess stock by offering employment to the "surplus" labour during downturns, so that the government effectively acts as an employer of the last resort. These "stocks" are then returned to the private sector when the economy picks up.
Section four examines the important question of whether such a scheme, on its own, represents the types of changes which Kalecki had in mind. In other words, can the implementation of such an employment program, by itself, change the dialectics of capitalist economies, reforming class relations, so that full employment becomes permanently achievable.
Or do these schemes merely act as bandages, as temporary solutions to the deeper problems.
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II Attaining full employment
According to Kalecki, the contradictory nature of capitalist dynamics is not the result of the classical inverse relation between the wage rate and the rate of profits. The existence of excess capacity destroys any direct relation between the two, so that changes in the wage rate, under contemporary capitalism, do not impact on aggregate profits, but merely on the level of employment and output in the opposite manner to that proposed by neoclassical theory. The aggregate level of profits, as well as the level of output, is determined by capitalist expenditure decisions, that is, by their consumption and investment. Investment plays a key role in the determination of the level of effective demand. However, investment, also plays a role in determining the size of the capital stock and the productivity of labour. It is with this dual function of investment, as both a form of expenditure and an addition to the existing stock of capital that the underlying contradiction of capitalism is most evident :
We see that the question, 'what causes periodic crises?" could be answered briefly: the fact that the investment is not only produced but also producing. Investment considered as capitalist spending is the source of prosperity, and every increase of it improves business and stimulates a further rise of spending for investment. But, at the same time investment is an addition to the capital equipment, and right from birth it competes with the older generation of this equipment. The tragedy of investment is that it calls forth the crisis because it is useful;. I do not wonder that many people consider this theory paradoxical. But it is not the theory which is paradoxical but its subject-the capitalist economy. (Kalecki, 1936-37 p. 554) .
Investment as expenditure and, therefore, as a source of profits is an important component of effective demand.. The crisis is caused when that investment manifests itself as new equipment so significantly increasing capacity. Unless effective demand grows at the same pace as the growth in capacity, the extreme case of balanced growth, it is likely to generate unused capacity with negative repercussions on future investment decisions and profits. So the key to the achievement and maintenance of full employment requires measures aimed at stimulating overall investment .
As this can come from either private or public investment, full employment can be achieved via fiscal stimulus. In this case, Kalecki argues, contrary to c ontemporary neoclassical opinion, that the burden of the national debt will not constitute a significant problem. Obviously, a constant proportion of debt to national income does not create any problem in financing interest payments.
If, by contrast, full employment has to be maintained through a rising budget deficit as a proportion of national income, then an appropriate tax will have to be devised in order to finance the increased interest burden. Kalecki recommends a capital tax, as this, unlike income tax, will not affect the profitability of investment if it is levied on all forms of wealth (including money balances), and hence is likely to leave investment unchanged. In the aggregate, government expenditure financed by a capital tax will not affect the income of capitalists as a class. The increase in income generated by the government expenditure will be offset by the tax, so that some capitalists will be better off while others are worse off 2 . In other words, it is possible to maintain levels of effective demand sufficient to generate full employment, without substantial domestic problems for the domestic economy 3 .
III The Political Obstacles
Although it is possible to achieve full employment, its maintenance is likely to run into insurmountable p roblems. In 'Political aspects of full employment' Kalecki appeared relatively optimistic about the efficacy of fiscal policy in achieving full employment. However, he believed that there were fundamental " political problems" which make full employment incompatible with capitalism, arguing that "there is a political background in the opposition to the full employment doctrine." [Kalecki 1943 p. 349 ]. Kalecki highlighted three main "reasons for the opposition of 2 Kalecki (1944) pp. 362-363) and Kalecki (1937) 3 Elsewhere we discuss the additional complications to the achievement of full employment caused by structural factors: Halevi and Kriesler (2000) .
'industrial leaders' to full employment achieved by government spending" resulting in class/political pressure being brought to bear [ibid.]:
1. General dislike of government intervention; especially with respect to employment creation. This is reinforced by the power of industry over government in the a bsence of such intervention. In this case, employment and the level of economic activity is extremely responsive to the "state of confidence' of the "captains of industry". This gives them significant power over government policy which fiscal intervention would blunt.
2. Dislike of the specific composition of government expenditure, especially with public investment and subsidization of mass consumption.
3. Dislike of the social and political consequences of the long term full employment:
We have considered the political reasons for the opposition to the policy of creating employment by government spending. But even if this opposition were overcome-as it may well be under the pressure of the masses-the maintenance of full employment would cause social and political changes which would give a new impetus to the opposition of the business leaders. Indeed, under a regime of permanent full employment, the 'sack' would cease to play its role as a disciplinary measure. The social position of the boss would be undermined, and the self-assurance and classconsciousness of the working, class would grow. Strikes for wage. increases and improvements in conditions of work would create political tension. It is true that profits would be higher under a regime of full employment than they are on the average under laissez-faire; and even the rise in wage rates resulting from the stronger bargaining power of the workers is less likely to reduce profits than to increase prices. and thus adversely affects only the rentier interests. But 'discipline in the factories and 'political stability' are more appreciated than profits by business leaders. Their class instinct tells them that lasting full employment is unsound from their point of view, and that unemployment is an integral part of the 'normal' capitalist system. [Kalecki 1943 p. 351] As a result of these considerations, Kalecki argues that the maintenance of full employment is incompatible with capitalism, without fundamental changes to the underlying institutions.
'Full employment capitalism' will, of course, have to develop new social and political institutions which will reflect the increased power of the working class. If capitalism can adjust itself to full employment, a fundamental reform will have been incorporated in it. If not, it will show itself an outmoded system which must be scrapped. [Kalecki 1943 p. 356] In other words, problems with effective demand are only symptoms of the underlying problem. The use of fiscal policy to increase demand will provide a temporary solution, but what is needed are more fundamental changes to the socio-economic and political structural of society.
Kalecki's explanation, which stresses the viewpoint of capitalists, can be reinforced by the Marxist stress from the viewpoint of workers. Workers, under capitalism, are alienated within the production process, during which it is their exploitation which allows capitalists to earn profits.
As a result, they will, whenever they have the power to do so, strive to improve both their working conditions and their pay. In other words, according to the logic of capitalism, capitalists are right to fear full employment. Empowered workers will use that power to improve their lot.
For Marx, unemployment was essential for the survival of capitalism. During the accumulation process, profits drove capital accumulation, increasing the demand for labour until all the excess labour was absorbed into the work force, and wages rose. This put pressure on profits which, as a result, fell. The resulting crash both led to structural change in the economy, and regenerated the reserve army of the unemployed, which then put downward pressure on wages, allowing profits to rise; hence starting the cycle again. This was reinforced by investment in labour saving technology, w hich increased stagnationist/unemployment tendencies. The relation was based on the inverse relation between the wage rate/rate of profits which was the foundation of classical analysis.
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Although Kalecki took from Marx the idea of the incompatibility of capitalism and full employment, he saw it operating via a very different mechanism. As Kalecki rejected the vision of competitive capitalism with little excess capacity, he developed a model where an increase in the wage rate, and in the level of wages would, in fact, increase profits. As a result of the stagnationist tendencies which he identified in capitalism, he believed that increases in wages would increase effective demand and thereby move in the same direction as profits. In other words, for Kalecki, wages and profits were no longer antagonistic.
The incompatibility of capitalism and full employment results from a more fundamental aspects of the class relationship. As the above discussion indicates, unemployment was the means by which the capitalist class asserted its control over the working class. Without unemployment, the inherent contradictions of the system would exasperate the underlying social and political tensions resulting in problems of discipline and instability. Either the institutional base of the economy would need to change, or full employment would have to be sacrificed. In retrospect we know that almost all capitalist economies took the easy way out, and abandoned the commitment to full employment., This was sanctioned, in exactly t he manner predicted by Kalecki, by economists who argued the impotence of fiscal policy and for the need for "sound finance".
IV Political aspects of buffer stock employment
We are now in a position to ask the question of the degree to which the suggestions of governments acting as employers of the last resort (ELR), or of buffer stock employment (BSE) would constitute the "fundamental reform" which would allow capitalism to save itself. 5 In answering this question, we need to consider the degree to which E LR can alleviate class 5 It should be noted that we will not consider the important benefits which such a scheme will bring. There can be no doubt that elimination of unemployment in any manner, no matter how temporary, will reduce the heavy social costs of unemployment associated with increased crime, health problems and other serious social problems [See, for example, Wray (1998) and Nevile and Kriesler (1998) ] However, the particular concern of the paper is with the longer term implications of such schemes.
conflicts, in other words, the extent to which is can reconcile the opposing interests of capital and labour in capitalist economies.
As discussed above, unemployment serves an important function in capitalist economies, mainly to provide a discipline on workers, both on wage demand and on their labour effort. The major part of this discipline comes, of course, from the loss in income, but a further substantial cost of unemployment is the loss of social as well as economic identify associated with joblessness. Concentrating on the lost income aspect, it is well know that the cost of job loss to a worker depends both on the likelihood of getting another job and of the loss of income associated both with unemployment and with the new job (Shapiro & Stiglitz 1984) . Buffer stock employment eliminates the first part of this income related cost. There is no job loss. This also means that the likelihood of regaining private sector employment must also be higher for these workers, as there are none of the negative effects on employability associated with joblessness.
Therefore, for the sack to maintain its power of discipline over workers, and to reduce inflationary pressure, the movement from private sector employment to BSE must present a cost to the worker in terms of income loss. This sets a maximum level to buffer stock wages.
Inflation control under contemporary capitalism is through restrictive fiscal and monetary policy building up the reserve army of unemployment, reinforced more recently by industrial relations policies which significantly erode the bargaining power of labour. The increased unemployment both reduces demand pressures and reduces the power of workers to maintain real wages. As a result, just as in Marx, unemployment causing falling real wages maintains the stability of the system. In the BSE model, this role is played by the movement of workers into BSE. As Mitchell (1998) argues:
As the BER [ratio of buffer stock employment to total employment] rises, due to an increase in interest rates and/or a fiscal tightening, resources are transferred from the inflating non-buffer stock sector into the buffer stock sector at a price set by the government; this price provides the inflation discipline. p. 551
In the advent of inflation, without the scheme, people dropping from employment to unemployment reduce inflationary pressure both by reducing demand and by reducing the militancy of the labour force (à la the reserve army). With the buffer scheme, people will drop from employment to buffer employment. Since the loss in wages and status, etc. is much reduced, this means that more people will have to change state in the buffer stock scheme. NAIBER [the "Non-accelerating inflation buffer employment share, and is the ratio of buffer s tock employment to total employment that is required top stabilise inflation." (Mitchell 1998 p. 547n] must be higher than NAIRU. This means that there is a clear opportunity cost of the scheme. Namely, that x% of the labour force, where x%= NAIBER -NAIRU will now be in buffer employment whereas previously they were "fully" employed.
This means that the scheme imposes a cost on some workers. In order to act as a discipline on inflation, workers do not fall as far as they do currently, that is, from full employment to unemployment; rather they fall from full employment to buffer stock employment. However, the cost of this is that many more workers need to fall. In other words, the contraction in the private sector needs to be much more severe to have the same impact on inflation. Of course, this will also have serious implications for private sector profitability, and growth.
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A related problem is the reaction of capitalists to the scheme. If the scheme succeeds, then it will reduce the control of the "captains of industry" in much the same way as would a period of prolonged full employment. We should expect the same reaction to the scheme as Kalecki noted would face any commitment to full employment. In other words, if capitalists perceive such schemes as t hreats to their profits or economic power -which is extremely likely considering the increased government expenditure and reduced levels of unemployment with which they are associated-then we would expect them to react. At the very least, if one country adopted such policies in isolation, capital flight would be a global way of disciplining the offending government.
The BSE proposals make implicit assumptions about the ways in which governments act, as well as to their benign motivations. When examined carefully, the idea that otherwise unemployed workers can be employed by the government -presumably in public works and the like -until effective demand picks up as to reabsorb those workers in the private sector at higher wages -is more than unrealistic: it is positively worrisome. The economy is, of course, assumed to remain fully capitalistic in its social relations of production. The State therefore will not have a neutral role. In this context the extreme case of the structuring of the unemployed in a de facto
State managed consortium occurred in the Arbeiter Front which existed in cartelized capitalist
Germany in the 1930s, that is during the regime of the national socialists, Nazis. In Germany the economic recovery initiated by the rearmament process was so strong as to generate quite rapidly a situation of virtual full employment, also thanks to the increase in military expenditure. Yet, formally, the role of the Arbeiter Front was precisely to marshall labour according to the priorities of the State. Although it is not suggested that this extreme would be repeated, nevertheless, it provides an important lesson. Only with very strong trade unions can this system be given some consideration but certainly this is not the case in the USA where they are t rying to export this idea. It will therefore lead to a super corporatist State without the countervailing powers that exist in Northern Europe (See Kriesler and Halevi, 1995) . Indeed, looking at past, (and the current) Presidents of the USA , it is easy to envisage the conscription of any buffer employment into military services. We should also note that such a scheme goes against the basic insight of both Kalecki and Keynes who saw the key to achieving full e mployment in capitalist economies as being control over investment. The State should target investment, not labour alone. Employment comes from investment and its composition in the way seen by Kalecki in 1943 who argued that investment must be based on social priorities in a consistent manner with full employment. BSE does not address this issue at all. In fact, as has been pointed out above, the private sector contractions necessary to maintain a discipline on inflation needs to be much higher under such schemes. The likely impact of this, independent of any further problems arising from the general capitalist reaction to the scheme itself, will be a severe dampening of investment.
V Some Conclusions
The discussion above has reiterated Kalecki's distinction between the possibility of achieving full employment in capitalist economies, and the overwhelming difficulty of maintaining it. As has been pointed out, governments can, through the use of policy -fiscal rather than monetary -achieve full employment without major problems to the economy. Kalecki showed that the traditional objection focusing on the problems of financing fiscal policy are easily overcome. However, although the achievement of full employment is essentially an economic matter, its maintenance becomes a political one. Full employment conflicts with the interests of capitalists as a class. As a result, they will bring great pressure to bear on governments, which will make the maintenance of that full employment extremely problematic.
The m ain concern of capitalists is that full employment lessens their power in the class struggle with workers, to impose conditions and wages which are favorable to them. Without changes to the fundamental institutions of capitalism, which will enable the resolution of some of this conflict without the cost of unemployment, the maintenance of full employment remains an unachievable goal in capitalist societies.
The BSE or ELR proposals for long term solutions to the problem of full employment in capitalist economies are not the fundamental reform in the Kaleckian sense. Rather than dealing with the underlying contradictions in capitalism by addressing aspects of class struggle, these solutions really only bandage over the problem. By focusing on labour and ignoring investment, it is not clear what they can achieve, although the likely outcomes are a decline in the economy's rate of growth due to lower level of investment over the cycle.
However, this does not mean that such schemes have no place. In the unlikely eventuality that capitalism can reform itself in the manner suggested by Kalecki, or if we can get investment polices "right", then BSE/ELR schemes would have an important role in dampening the effects of cyclical variations in income and employment. A ll economies, even planned ones, are subject to such cyclical influences, and, the strength of the prosed schemes is that they can quarantine the most severe effects of these cyclical movements from the workforce.
